





Model for implementing military biological activities

Organisational chart for implementing military biological programmes



U.S. Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program in the Middle East region



New structures for implementation of U.S. biological strategic plans

Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy, GHSD

Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy, OPPRP



Implementing projects under the Biological Threat Reduction Program

Change of customers, contractors



Foreign programmes to support Ukrainian researchers



The MSCA4Ukraine programme aims to support displaced Ukrainian researchers



Long-term programme to support Ukrainian researchers of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.

(December 2022)

Projects implemented by the International Science and Technology Center in the post-Soviet region in Pentagon's interests

Researching and countering proliferation of highly hazardous infections

<p>2410 Project 'Assessment of the natural resistance of the brucellosis pathogen in domestic and wild animals (possibility of brucellosis transmission to humans)' (completed in September 2022)</p>	<p>2513 Project 'Study of risk factors and molecular characteristics of resistant and pan-resistant hypervirulent Enterobacteriaceae' (February 2020–October 2022)</p>	<p>2545 Project 'Modelling reassessment at the cellular, clinical, and phylogenetic levels in cases of bunyaviruses' (April 2022–March 2025)</p>
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Biosafety Enhancement Program in Afghanistan

BIOSECURITY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM (BEP) IN AFGHANISTAN	BEP	Background	BEP	FY16 FOCUS AREAS
<p>Nathan Gregg, Ms. Salman, and Brett Goode and Afghan Team Biosecurity Engagement Program U.S. Department of State November 2015</p> <p><i>Biological Threat Drivers:</i> • Active groups: Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani • Endemic High-Risk Pathogens • Emerging PMSI Activities</p> <p><i>Decision of Labor:</i> • Department of Defense – Human Biosecurity • State Department – Veterinary Biosecurity</p>		<p>Mission: Detain terrorist and insurgent organizations across its expertise and especially dangerous pathogens that could be exploited as part of a bioterrorism attack against the U.S., homeland or national interests abroad.</p>		<p>Biological Risk Management Practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop Secure Sample Transportation in Kabul and Ray Province (Kandahar, Nangarhar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz) • Raise Awareness of Biothreats and Promote a Culture of Responsibility Among the Next Generation of Afghan Life Sciences • Engage Law Enforcement Sector to detect and disrupt terrorist plots • Improve Capacity for Disease Detection (Focus on Select Agent pathogens)

U.S. Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program in the Middle East region

U.S. Department of State
Program Officer: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
February 2016...


U.S.'s disregard for international law on biological weapons nonproliferation



Questions submitted by the Russian Federation to the United States and Ukraine

Formal Consultative Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

BWC/COP/2010/RUS/01
Date: 10 October 2010
Original English
Original French
Original Spanish

Question 1: In the context of the activities of biological laboratories in the territory of Ukraine, what are the main areas of concern regarding the implementation of obligations under Article I of the BTWC?

What are the main areas of concern regarding the implementation of obligations under Article I of the BTWC? What are the main areas of concern regarding the implementation of obligations under Article IV of the BTWC?

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Questions of the Russian Federation to the United States and Ukraine regarding the compliance with their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) in the context of the activities of biological laboratories in the territory of Ukraine

Submitted by the Russian Federation

1. Questions to Ukraine regarding compliance with obligations under Part I of Article I of the BTWC:

What are the main areas of concern regarding the implementation of obligations under Article I of the BTWC? What are the main areas of concern regarding the implementation of obligations under Article IV of the BTWC?

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Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

UN Security Council

Consultative meeting of BTWC member-states

Results of voting on adopting the resolution:

voted – 15
for – 2
against – 3
abstain – 10

43 delegations spoke at the meeting:
Voted for or took a neutral position – 22 states.
Voted against – 21 states.

Based on the voting results,
the Russian Federation
was not included in the
Executive Board

Measures to strengthen the BTWC proposed by foreign member-states

Ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

BWC/COP/2010/NED/01
Date: 11 November 2010
English only

Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

BWC/COP/2010/PER/01
Date: 12 November 2010
English only

Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

BWC/COP/2010/PER/02
Date: 13 November 2010
English only

Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

BWC/COP/2010/PER/03
Date: 14 November 2010
English only

Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

Conference to Global Biosafety: Engaging youth participation in the Convention

Conference to Global Biosafety: Engaging youth participation in the Convention

Approach to Strengthening Measures for Emerging Infectious Diseases based on Lessons Learned from the Ebola Outbreak

Submitted by Japan

1. Introduction

1. The Ebola crisis in West Africa made it clear that the international community should enhance capacity and role in a timely manner to prevent and respond to emerging infectious diseases. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa – the largest recorded since the 1970s – demonstrated the need for a coordinated international response to ensure the safety of populations and the health of individuals, and showed the value of strengthening international cooperation in infectious disease prevention and control.

2. Under these circumstances, Japan immediately formed its national and local task forces to deal with the threat of emerging infectious diseases. The Japanese government has been working closely with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other countries to support the international community's efforts to combat the Ebola crisis.

In 2015, WHO declared an Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In response to the outbreak, the Japanese government has been working closely with the WHO and other countries to support the international community's efforts to combat the Ebola crisis.

3. The WHO Ebola Emergency Response Team has recommended that the Japanese government take the following measures to prevent and respond to emerging infectious diseases.

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15. The WHO Ebola Emergency Response Team has recommended that the Japanese government take the following measures to prevent and respond to emerging infectious diseases.

16. The WHO Ebola Emergency Response Team has recommended that the Japanese government take the following measures to prevent and respond to emerging infectious diseases.

1. Strengthening responses to emerging infectious diseases: Drawing lessons from the Ebola outbreak (proposed by Japan)

2. Promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment as an integral part of the institutional strengthening of the BTWC (proposed by Panama)

3. Engaging the next generation in global biosafety and biosecurity: proposals for greater youth participation in the BTWC (proposed by Kenya and Pakistan)

4. Creation of SecBio - an international platform for biosafety and biosecurity (proposed by France)




Expansion of the ranges of mosquito vectors in Europe



Aedes albopictus



Aedes aegypti



Search for smallpox virus mimics

Research Update

Surveillance, Monitoring, and Evaluation for Tuberculosis Control

Country-specific surveillance systems for tuberculosis have been developed in a large number of countries. These surveillance systems have been designed to collect information on the incidence and prevalence of tuberculosis and to evaluate the effectiveness of control programs. In addition, surveillance systems can be used to monitor trends in tuberculosis incidence and prevalence, and to evaluate the impact of control programs on tuberculosis incidence and prevalence.

While initially all of these surveillance systems were developed as a continuous monitoring system, many have now evolved into a one-time survey. Although the design of these surveillance systems varies from country to country, they generally include a survey of the population at risk for tuberculosis. Depending on the surveillance system, the survey may be conducted under different circumstances. For example, in 1989, the United States conducted a survey of the population at risk for tuberculosis in 1989, while in 1990, the United States conducted a survey of the population at risk for tuberculosis in 1990.

The results of the survey in 1989 showed that the incidence of tuberculosis was approximately 10 cases per 100,000 persons. The results of the survey in 1990 showed that the incidence of tuberculosis was approximately 12 cases per 100,000 persons.

Global Monitoring

The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a global monitoring system for tuberculosis. This system includes a survey of the population at risk for tuberculosis, and a survey of the incidence of tuberculosis.

On September 28, 2000, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) entered into an agreement with Glaxo (Cambridge, MA) to produce a new tuberculosis vaccine. Like the vaccine used to eradicate smallpox, the new vaccine will contain live vaccinia virus; however, it will be produced in cell cultures by modern vaccine production techniques'

Horsepox Virus Synthesis

Creation of a modified virus that causes 80% mortality in model animals, based on the Omicron strain and the original Wuhan variant

BOSTON LAB MAKES NEW DEADLY COVID STRAIN

EXCLUSIVE: This is playing with fire - it could spark a lab-generated pandemic! Experts slam Boston lab where scientists have created a new deadly Omicron strain with an 80% kill rate in mice

Scientists removed spike from Omicron

Virus killed 80% of rodents



Persons involved in military biological dossier



Kenneth Myers



Robert Pope



Joanna Wintrol



Kevin Olival



Karen Sailors



Lewis Von Thaer



Mikhail Usaty



Tatiana Kiryazova



Filippa Lentzos



Gemma Bowsher



Irina Demchishina



Daria Ponamorenko



Thomas Wahl



Denis Muzyka



Viktor Gavrilenko



Aleksandr Mezinov



Gina Haspel
Former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency
2018-2021

Supervised the implementation of
military biological programs by the
CIA



Alex Azar
Former United States Secretary of
Health and Human Services
(2018-2021)



Anthony Fauci
Former Chief
Medical Advisor to the President of
United States and Former Director
of NIAID



Albert Bourla
Chairman and CEO of
Pfizer



Stéphane Bancel
CEO of Moderna Therapeutics





Nita Madhav
CEO of Metabiota
2019-2022



Peter Daszak
President of
EcoHealth Alliance




U.S. Army Activities in the United States Biological Warfare Programs



Statement of U.S. Department of Defense on the launch of a training program in the field of bioproduction



Bioproduction Training Program



"The DoD MILs seek to revitalize the U.S.'s domestic manufacturing capability... that enhances America's strategic competitiveness while enabling the military of tomorrow."



*...i. Registered Apprenticeship Program:
a. Dynamic Pre-Apprenticeship with Practical Skills - 2 months;
b. On-the-job Training (OUT) - 12 months...*